

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2941

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5768

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: GDS 12:31/81

TAGS: MCAF, NATO

SUBJECT: MILITARY COMMITTEE' RISK ASSESSMENT AND DOD MILITARY
FORCE CAPABILITIES BRIEFING

SUMMARY: AT PERMREPS LUNCH NOVEMBER 27, SYG LUNS AND BELGIAN
PERMREP POINTED TO DIFFERING ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS OF NATO
AND WP FORCE CAPABILITIES AS CONTAINED IN NATO MC'S LATEST
RISK ASSESSMENT AND CURRENT DOD BRIEFING. THEY WONDERED HOW
MC ASSESSMENT, IN WHICH U.S. MILREP CONCURRED, COULD BE
AT SUCH VARIANCE WITH U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY'S VIEWS. THIS
MESSAGE IS TO ALERT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND SECRETARY
KISSINGER THAT THEY CAN EXPECT QUESTIONS AT
DECEMBER MILISTERIALS ABOUT ALLEGED DIFFERENCES WITHIN
USG ON THE THREAT AND NATO FORCE CAPABILITIES. QUESTIONS
AND COMMENTS COULD BE ALONG THE LINES OF THE EXCHANGE
REPORTED BELOW. END SUMMARY

1. AT PERMREPS' LUNCH NOVEMBER 27, SYG LUNS REFERRED
TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S LATEST RISK ASSESSMENT,
" OVERALL MILITARY SUITABILITY OF THE 1974-1978 FORCE PLAN
AND THE ASSOCIATED DEGREE OF RISK" (MCM-83-73, NOVEM-
BER 22, 1973, POUCHED TO WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 23).

2. LUNS ASKED EVERYONE TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE
ASSESSMENT, AND CAUTIONED THEM ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS
WHICH REFLECT THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE MILITARY COM-
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MITTEE.

3. BELGIAN PERMREP DE STAERCKE SUGGESTED THE MC
ASSESSMENT DID NOT MESH WITH THE PENTAGON ASSESSMENT,

WHICH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS DISCUSSED AT THE JUNE DPC AND ALSO WITH MODS IN WASHINGTON, AND ABOUT WHICH THE PENTAGON RECENTLY MADE A PRESENTATION TO THE NAC AND THE MC. HE ASKED HOW THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S VIEW COULD BE SO DIFFERENT AND YET BE UNANIMOUS, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES SITS ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

4. LUNS THOUGHT SCHLESINGER HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE PESSIMISTIC IN HIS COMMENTS AT THE HAGUE NPG MEETING THAN HE WAS AT THE DPC IN JUNE.

5. DE STAERCKE ASKED IF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REPORT REPRESENTED THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE U.S. MILITARY REP. LUNS SAID YES. DE STAERCKE SUGGESTED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD MAKE SOME REMARK IN THEIR ASSESSMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF OTHER ASSESSMENTS BASED ON OTHER ASSUMPTIONS AND THAT THE MC HAD TAKEN THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR UNANIMOUS ASSESSMENT. LUNS REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO DO THAT AT THIS TIME. LUNS REMARKED HE IS PRESENTLY WORKING ON HIS OWN ASSESSMENT, AND HIS OFFICIALS AGREE WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AS PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

6. DE STAERCKE SAID IT IS A STRANGE SITUATION WHEN THE MOST IMPORTANT NATION'S SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COMES BEFORE THE DPC AND APPARENTLY DISAGREES WITH THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON WHICH HIS REPRESENTATIVE SITS. LUNS NOTED THAT ALL NATIONS ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ASSESSMENT, WHICH LEADS TO A COMMON MC VIEW. IF THE U.S. OR ANOTHER COUNTRY DOESN'T AGREE WITH THE ASSESSMENT, IT COULD SAY SO IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

7. TURKISH PERMREP ERALP SAID THE KEY IS WHAT IS GOING TO BE IN THE DPC COMMUNIQUE, ON WHICH WORK IS SECRET

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ALREADY STARTING. ERALP BELIEVED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT REFLECT A NOTE OF OPTIMISM BECAUSE THAT WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY.

8. DE STAERCKE UNDERLINED THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES MADE HIS CASE IN THE DPC AND REPEATED IT TO MANY MINISTERS WHEN THEY VISITED THE UNITED STATES. THE COUNCIL AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE RECEIVED A SPECIAL BRIEFING FROM THE U.S. PENTAGON. NOW COMES THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT AS IF THIS U.S. BRIEFING NEVER HAPPENED AND, SEEMS TO SAY, IN EFFECT, IT IS THEIR UNANIMOUS VIEW THAT IT IS WRONG. DE STAERCKE SUGGESTED THAT THE MC ASSESSMENT SHOULD REFERENCE THE

DOD BRIEFING AND POINT OUT THAT IT IS THE SENSE OF THE ALLIANCE THAT THE U.S. VIEW WAS SIMPLY ONE STUDY BASED ON A CERTAIN SET OF ASSUMPTIONS, SO THAT HE AND OTHERS WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE SOME ANSWERS TO THEIR MINISTERS. OTHERWISE, THEIR MINISTERS WON'T BE PERSUADED OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF

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9. RUMSFELD SAID THAT TO ASSESS THE BALANCE IS DIFFICULT, THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER DOESN'T LEND ITSELF TO PROVEABLE ONCLUSIONS, AND THAT WHAT IS BEING ASKED IS WHO IS GOING TO WIN THE WAR, AND YOU CANNOT KNOW THAT FOR CERTAIN UNTIL A WAR IS FOUGHT. THERE ARE SOME FACTS THAT ALL CAN DISCUSS AND FINALLY AGREE ON. THEN THERE IS THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON THESE FACTS BY MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. IN SOME CASES PEOPLE WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT THAT IS SIMPLY THEIR BEST JUDGEMENT. IN SOME CASES POSSIBLY SOME MAY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO THE ASSUMPTIONS AND WILL MAKE A JUDGMENT THAT THE EMPHASIS THEY FEEL THEY SHOULD PLACE ON THE FACTS AVAILABLE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT OR SHOULD BE ONE WHICH WILL HELP TO SUSTAIN NECESSARY BUDGETS TO THE EXPENT POSSIBLE - AND I DON'T FAULT THAT.

10. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW THAT NATO WAS AS FAR APART ON THIS MATTER AS IT MIGHT SEEM. WHILE I UNDERSTOOD DE STAERCKE'S DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO BE PERSUASIVE TO HIS MINISTER, THE FACT IS WE ARE NEVER GOING TO BE ABLE TO PROVE A CASE IN THIS AREA, IT CANNOT BE MATHEMATICALLY CERTAIN.

11. PECK AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AT LEAST MAKE A REFERENCE TO THE

DOD BRIEFING IN ITS RISK ASSESSMENT. DE STAERCKE SAID
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HE WANTED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ARGUMENTS TO USE WITH
HIS MINISTER OF DEFENSE SO THAT BELGIUM WOULD NOT
REDUCE ITS DEFENSE BUDGET, A POSSIBILITY HE WAS CON-
CERNED ABOUT.

12. THIS PROBLEM SHOULD WORK ITSELF OUT SOMEWHAT OVER TIME
SINCE, AT U.S. REQUEST, THE MC HAS AGREED TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE
BALANCE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL FORCES THAT MIGHT
REASONABLY BE AVAILABLE TO NATO IN TIME OF WAR - TO
INCLUDE FRENCH AND ALLIES' UNCOMMITTED FORCES. HOPE-
FULLY THIS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE SPRING 1974 DPC.RUMSFELD

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF

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